As the Trump administration prepares to increase the enormous defense budget of the United States to approximately one billion dollars, it is an appropriate time to describe how the US weapons industry participates in a normalized corruption structure that I call defense stupid. The military-industrial complex in which President Eisenhower warned in 1961 has grown and evolved in a very wasteful way, promotes the armed conflict and weakens the national defense. I will describe this pernicious renewal system and sacrifice some recommendations to finish it.
A few years ago, I did the diagram show below that represents the financial circulatory system of the American military-industrial complex (also known as the BLOB). Eisenhower was originally intended to describe it as the military-industrial-consivious complex, and this would have a more precise term because the financing committees of the Defense Budget of the Congress are the heartbeat heart of the gout.
In general, it is not understood how few people direct the flow of the hundreds of billions that the United States spends every year in defense. The senators and representatives in the Congress’s armed services and appropriation committees are easy objectives for the lobbyists of the defense corporations. Weapons manufacturers spend around $ 70 million a year in lobbying in Washington, and generously donate members of the key committees that control the defense budget.
The employees of the committee responsible for the advice on the elements of the defense budget are surpassed by the lobbyists of the industry, who win considerably more and are competent in the arts of persuasion. As of 2023 there were 708 Washington active lobbyists who worked for defense corporations. Most of these lobbyists have gone through “rotating” or military or governmental works and are intimately familiar with the political terrain.
The objectives of the lobbyists are double: it promotes the growth of the General Defense Budget and defends the weapons programs of its employers. There are great sums at stake. Althegh In recent years, the United States Defense Budget has consumed approximately an eighth part of the total federal budget, has approximately half of the discretionary budget. The discretionary budget is all disbursements that are not legally Bond and, therefore, directly under the control of Congress every year.
If Trump’s proposition cuts to national programs and the increase in the defense budget at $ 1 billion are approved, the United States will further spend the discretionary budget on arms and war, which will lead to the participation of the defense to 60%.
How is the United States defense industry such a successful racket? I have already mentioned its powerful lobbying capacity. Now let’s examine some tools of your trade.
Inflation of threats
A mass defense budget should be justified by threats to the United States. If there are no legitimate threats, the image channel can be conjured. Working with Think Tanks, contacts of the warm media and politicians, almost any foreign entity can be swollen to a serious threat to the “interests” of the defense industry. In several moments, Cuba, Nicaragua, Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya were considered military threats. For 20 years, Islamic terrorism was the threat that justified huge US military budgets. With the rebirth of the confrontation of the Cold War with Russia and China, we have returned to a proven and true national security test. The costumes change, but the show continues.
Gold platform
It is an article of faith in the United States Defense Community that advanced highly complex weapons can overcome the presumably lower weapons or potential adversaries. This bias towards the ambitious application of avant -garde technologies is beneficial for arms manufacturers because it increases the costs of weapons programs and justifies delays and difficulties in completing projects. The result is an excessive specification process of disappointing weapons and results in the implemented system.
An example of this approach is the M777 Howwerzer. This field gun was designed to be highly transportable, incorporating titanium pieces and other light components. On the battlefield in Ukraine, the M777 has suffered a short life in the barrel, and the replacement of barrels and other worn parts has become a logistics problem. The B2 Stealth Bomber, at a cost of $ 2 billion per plane, had the rare distinction to cost more than gold machines until 2008. Gold prices have increased since then, but the production of the B2 stopped in 2001 and only 20 are operational. Other examples of gold -plated projects are the Gerald Ford aircraft carriers, the Zumwalt destroyer and the Tilts Osprey rotor transport plane.
B2 Stealth bomber – Golden Goose?
No competition
The magic of the market has not been working in favor of US taxpayers, since defense corporations have consolidated in five giants that manage the largest weapons projects, such as the F35, nuclear submarines, ICBM and the patriot missile system.
Moreover, part of the bidding of the contract has become a single source. The $ 13 billion contract to replace the US land. UU launched Minuteman ICBM Force was granted to Northrop Grumman without any competitive offer. What could go wrong?
Deferred bribery
Hanging the perspective of a lucrative future employment is not considered bribery if there is no explicit sacrifice. A superior military officer in the United States can withdraw after 20 years and receive a pension from approximately 50% of the military salary, then take a lobbying work in the defense sector that wins twice the anterior military salary. This process is what makes the turn by turn, and results in most of the Washington defense lobbyists who have previous military or government careers. Even representatives retired from Congress can take advantage of employment lobbying if they have influence on key financing committees. Therefore, decisions about military expenses are in the hands of people who benefit from friendly actions with possible future employers, and everything is perfectly legal.
Posts of moving objectives
When developing complex and highly sophisticated weapons systems, delays and excess costs are frequently produced. Defense contractors are rarely punished for failures to meet the schedule and costs requirements. On the other hand, the project schedules extend and complementary funds are granted. The F35 combat program has been delayed in more than 8 years and has extended original cost expectations at $ 165 billion.
Lowering the network
When a large weapons program is put into trouble, performance specifications sometimes relax to allow the program to continue. The maneuverability, acceleration and combat radio requirements of the F35 relaxed in the course of the program. A general reduction of weapons testing requirements has also been underway in recent years, for the taste of defense contractors.
The secret shield
If nobody knows what he is doing, nobody knows what he is doing, and this maxim applies to the “Black Budget” programs of the United States Department of Defense. Taking into account the shameful failures of defense projects that are publicly responsible, one can only imagine what embezzlement meets the mantle of the secret that surrounds the programs considered for public dissemination. The black budget of unleashed secret programs has grown well at $ 50 billion.
What can be done
Although it is unlikely that the United States Congress resisted the lobbying power of the defense industry, there are several measures that should be taken to reduce the abuses of defense extortion
Overflowing It is the arrest of the elegant commercial for a contractor for misconduct that has damaged the interests of the government. This can be a prohibition for a specific interval or permanent prohibition. Debarrowen is a legal sanction that has rarely used the leg. A greater threat threat would result in a decrease in failed deadlines and cost excesses.
Blocking rotating doors It can be easily carried out through the legislation that increases the elapsed time required between the end of the government service and employment as a lobbyist. Establishing an interval of five or ten years would considerably reduce the negative consequences of turning through hiring.
Defense Audit Department It would improve the supervision of the contractor’s activity and provide valuable management information about the life cycle costs of the main weapons programs. Unfortunately, DOD has failed to achieve successful audits. Until the Congress penalizes armed services for audit failures, this goal is likely to be achieved.
Design reviews and independent projects It would help avoid many faults or weapons development projects through the best risk evaluation. Contractors working in a permissive regulatory environment have perverse incentives to accept program risks when there are no serious consequences for low performance. Independent reviewers would not be subject to such influences.
Nationalization It is the best remedy for organized defense crime. The selective nationalization of projects would be appropriate for the mass production of reliable and effective conventional weapons that defense corporations consider relatively unattractive commitments. By eliminating misceamed earnings incentives and time prioritization and under the end of the budgetary project, management incentives can align with the interests of US taxpayers, and not those of corporate shareholders.
Conclusion
American defense corporations have been successful when receiving a huge portion of the annual discretionary federal budget, approximately half billion dollars, through extortion legally sanctioned in the halls of the Congress of the United States. In addition to the deviation of resources of productive domestic uses, the money spent has produced a series of poorly defective weapons projects that weakened national security weakened instead of strengthening it. The reforms in this sector are very necessary. These should include measures to stop the political influence of defense corporations, improve the process of acquiring weapons and increase the effective supervision of defense projects. Until such reforms are implemented, the naked capitalism of the United States defense industry will continue to be a ugly view.
